Author Archives: Francisco R. Rodríguez
¿Quién se beneficia de la licencia a Chevron de la OFAC?
En los últimos días, el gobierno estadounidense autorizó a Chevron Corporation vender petróleo venezolano en los mercados de EEUU, pero le prohibió realizar pagos de impuestos y regalías al gobierno venezolano. Argumentamos que la restricción de estos pagos es simbólica porque los pasivos fiscales no recaen en Chevron, sino en las empresas mixtas en las que Chevron es un socio minoritario y cuyas decisiones no puede controlar. Además, mostramos que mientras la recuperación del acceso a los mercados estadounidenses permita a las empresas mixtas de Chevron aumentar los niveles de producción, el gobierno de Maduro recibirá flujos adicionales de divisas que puede utilizar a voluntad. Este resultado se mantiene independientemente de si el incremento de los ingresos se utiliza para reducir los atrasos de la deuda de PDVSA con Chevron.
Who Benefits from OFAC’s Chevron License?
In recent days, the US government authorized Chevron Corporation to resell Venezuelan oil in US markets but barred it from making tax and royalty payments to the Venezuelan state. We argue that the restriction on these payments is symbolic because fiscal liabilities are incurred not by Chevron but by the joint ventures in which Chevron is a minority partner and whose decisions it is unable to control. Furthermore, we show that as long as regaining access to US markets enables Chevron joint ventures to increase production levels, the Maduro government will receive additional hard currency revenue flows which it can use at will. This result holds regardless of whether incremental revenues are used to reduce PDVSA’s debt arrears with Chevron.
Political Growth Collapses
We argue that economic collapses can result from the adoption by political actors of strategies that generate severe negative economic externalities for society. We establish the conditions for political conflict to become economically destructive and develop a diagnostics toolkit to identifywhen income declines are consequence of the breakdown of conflict-management arrangements.When political conflict drives aContinue reading “Political Growth Collapses”
The economic determinants of Venezuela’s hunger crisis
This paper argues that Venezuela’s hunger crisis was caused by the collapse of the country’s import capacity. I show evidence supporting the hypothesis that the key driver of the decrease in caloric intake was the decline of more than nine-tenths in oil revenues, which sparked an economic contraction and forced the economy to undertake massiveContinue reading “The economic determinants of Venezuela’s hunger crisis”
Es hora de aliviar las sanciones. Cuidado cómo lo haces.
Un comentario sobre Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de Venezuela del Atlantic Council Francisco Rodríguez. Director, Petróleo por Venezuela El Atlantic Council acaba de publicar un informe, “ Exploring Oil-Finded Humanitarian Frameworks for Venezuela ”, que evalúa las propuestas de programas humanitarios financiados con petróleo para Venezuela que compiten entre sí, y establece una serieContinue reading “Es hora de aliviar las sanciones. Cuidado cómo lo haces.”
Sanctioning Venezuela
This paper presents a summary of the evidence on the economic effects of financial and oil sanctions on Venezuela between 2017 and 2020. This paper is a chapter of my upcoming book, Scorched Earth: The Political Economy of Venezuela’s Collapse, 2012-2020.
It’s Time to Ease Sanctions. Careful How You Do It.
A comment on The Atlantic Council Venezuela Working Group’s “Exploring Oil-Funded Humanitarian Frameworks for Venezuela” Francisco Rodríguez. Director, Oil for Venezuela The Atlantic Council has just published a report, “Exploring Oil-Funded Humanitarian Frameworks for Venezuela,” that assesses competing oil-funded humanitarian program proposals for Venezuela and sets out a series of recommendations of general principles thatContinue reading “It’s Time to Ease Sanctions. Careful How You Do It.”
The end of Venezuela’s hyperinflation
Lasting 37 months, Venezuela’s hyperinflation was the third longest episode documented in world history. In the end, Venezuelans shifted away from local currency into dollars to protect their savings, eroding the capacity of the government to fund itself through inflation. Hyperinflation came to an end not because the government chose to stop printing money, butContinue reading “The end of Venezuela’s hyperinflation”
El fin de la hiperinflación venezolana
Con una duración de 37 meses, la hiperinflación venezolana fue el tercer episodio más largo documentado en la historia. Al final, los venezolanos cambiaron sus tenencias de bolívares por dólares para proteger sus ahorros, reduciendo la capacidad del gobierno para financiarse a través de la inflación. La hiperinflación llegó a su fin no porque elContinue reading “El fin de la hiperinflación venezolana”
Francisco R. Rodríguez 