Cooperative Responses to Venezuela’s Crisis: A Roadmap for Negotiations

Wednesday, November 1, 2023. 12:00 a.m. – 1:30 p.m.

The Forum SIE Complex, Denver University, Colorado.

Speakers:

David Smilde Charles A. and Leo M. Favrot Professor of Human Relations, Tulane University.

William Neumann Journalist.

Francisco Rodriguez Director, Oil For Venezuela. Rice Family Professor Josef Korbel School, Denver University

Moderator:

Paula Ramón. Journalist, Agence France-Presse.

Impact of Unilateral Sanctions on Health-Related SDGs

Wednesday, September 20, 2023.

Side Event during the 54th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva.

Click here to watch the video

Speakers:

Hector Constant Rosales Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations Office

Michael Fakhri UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food

Francisco Rodriguez Director, Oil For Venezuela. Rice Family Professor Josef Korbel School, Denver University

Moderator:

Alena Douhan, UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights

Season 2, Episode 14: Francisco Rodriguez, The Human Consequences of Economic SanctionsVenezuela Negotiations: Light at the End of the Tunnel?

Tuesday, August 22, 2023.

Book Club with Jeff Sachs Podcast

Click here to watch the episode

Interviewd:

Francisco Rodriguez Director, Oil For Venezuela. Rice Family Professor Josef Korbel School, Denver University

Interviewer:

Jeffrey Sachs Director, Center for Sustainable Development, Columbia University

Sanctions and Human Development

Fifty percent of people in the developing world today live in a country subject to trade sanctions. There is significant evidence that these sanctions affect the capabilities and freedoms enjoyed by people living in these countries. This evidence raises serious questions regarding the ethical implications of sanctions regimes. I sketch several proposals to reform sanctions regimes so as to reduce their negative consequences on economic and human development. 

The Global Seigniorage Duopoly

The inadequacy of global liquidity provision and the unequal distribution of its benefits stem from a fundamental distortion: the exercise of market power by the two largest issuers of international currencies.  The United States and Europe jointly provide the currencies used for 79 percent of global reserves and 91 percent of trade invoicing, forming a duopoly in the means of payment used by the world economy. The exercise of this market power allows them to capture the bulk of seigniorage rents associated with the provision of global liquidity while constraining developing country growth and limiting the scope of global countercyclical policies.  Were the International Monetary Fund to comply with its statutory obligation to make Special Drawing Rights the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system, developing countries would gain access to a source of finance currently monopolized by advanced economies.

Opinión de la Corte de Delaware en caso Citgo

El 23 de marzo de 2023, el Juez Leonard Stark de la Corte Distrital de Delaware emitió una orden determinando que el Gobierno Interino de Venezuela encabezado por Juan Guaidó había ejercido control extensivo sobre PDVSA, lo que permitía que los acreedores de Venezuela ejerciesen acciones de embargo sobre las acciones de la casa matriz de Citgo. Con el objetivo de contribuir a la discusión pública, aquí proveemos una traducción al español de la opinión del Juez Stark.

Aquí se puede conseguir la versión original en inglés publicada por la Corte:

How Clientelism Works: Evidence from the Barinas Special Election

Published in the World Development Journal

Do politicians target the benefits of social programs to party loyalists or to swing voters? Traditional tests of this question are clouded by an identification problem caused by the simultaneity of politician and voter choices to participate in the exchange of assistance for votes. I use the holding of an unanticipated repeat gubernatorial election in the Venezuelan state of Barinas in 2022 as a natural experiment to identify the effects of elections on the distribution of government assistance. I estimate that the holding of the election led to an increase in the probability of voters in Barinas receiving food packages in comparison with the control group of voters in the state of Apure. I also find that moderate opposition and third-party voters received larger increases in food benefits. These results are consistent with the predictions of spatial models, according to which elections lead governments to direct more benefits to swing voters instead of core supporters. The findings illustrate why investigation of cross-sectional correlations is insufficient to test the implications of theories of voting if it is not accompanied by a clear identification strategy to help isolate the source of the underlying shocks.

Quantifying Venezuela’s Destructive Conflict

How much have sanctions, and other politically induced restrictions on economic activity, affected the Venezuelan economy?  How much of the country’s decline can be attributed to these causes, as opposed to the more standard causes of poor policies and external shocks?  In this paper I offer a quantification of the effect of alternative causes. The bottom line is that around half of the country’s economic contraction between 2012 and 2020 can be explained as a result of sanctions and other politically induced restrictions such as the withdrawal of government recognition.

Revisiting the opposition’s debt restructuring guidelines

On July 3, 2019, the opposition-appointed Office of the Special Attorney General of Venezuela published a document outlining the principles for the country’s eventual debt restructuring. On March 23, 2023, Delaware District Court Judge Leonard Stark cited this document as proof of the lack of appropriate separation between the management of the country’s oil industry and the interim government, serving as the basis for the decision to allow Venezuela creditors to seek orders to attach CITGO. In this post I reproduce the comments that I published just after the publication of the opposition’s guidelines, arguing that the promise to give different creditors of the Venezuelan state equal treatment was highly problematic and could cause legal problems down the road.